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The Influence of Discrimination and Fairness on Collective Self-Esteem
This article examines the influence of discrimination and fairness on collective self-esteem. Whereas social identity theory's self-esteem hypothesis emphasizes that discrimination can enhance self-esteem, the authors contend that this self-esteem advantage will actually reverse when groups are primed with the idea of engaging in a fair intergroup competition. They measured (Study 1) and manipulated (Study 2) discrimination and fairness in real (Study 1) and minimal (Study 2) groups, after which they manipulated the presence of an intergroup competition in both studies. Collective selfesteem served as the main dependent measure. Results indicated that when an intergroup competition was present or impending, previously expressed fairness (or less discrimination) was positively related to selfesteem, whereas discrimination was positively related to collective self-esteem in the absence of an intergroup competition. Results are discussed in terms of social identity theory and the importance of the broader social context for examining the relationship between discrimination and self-esteem.
Keywords: discrimination; self-esteem; intergroup relations; social identity; fairness; legitimacy A classic but controversial theme within the psychology of intergroup relations concerns the relationship between expressed discrimination and self-esteem. Based on the argument from social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979 ) that positive group distinctiveness contributes to feelings of self-worth and that intergroup discrimination can enhance positive group which they belong (i.e., their so-called social identity; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) . The theory states that people are motivated to obtain a positive social identity, a need that is met by inclusion in groups that are positively distinctive from relevant out-groups. A positive social identity is in turn reflected in high levels of collective self-esteem (e.g., Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2002; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) .
One way to obtain a positive social identity is through intergroup discrimination. The rationale behind this is that discrimination creates positive intergroup comparisons and, thereby, positive intergroup distinctiveness. In research on social identity, intergroup discrimination is often defined in terms of the unequal division of material (e.g., money) or symbolic resources (e.g., points) between members of the in-group and the out-group, favoring the in-group. Fairness is the strategy that refers to an equal division of resources between the in-group and the out-group (Bourhis, Sachdev, & Gagnon, 1994) . In this research we also adopt these definitions of discrimination and fairness.
Based on the above considerations, the idea developed within the context of social identity theory that intergroup discrimination should be related to collective self-esteem as it enhances positive group distinctiveness. The most explicit elaboration of this idea is Abrams and Hogg's (1988) self-esteem hypothesis, which consists of two corollaries: The first is that successful discrimination enhances social identity and thus elevates self-esteem (i.e., self-esteem is the dependent variable); the second is that low or threatened self-esteem triggers discrimination to enhance social identity (i.e., self-esteem is the independent variable). 1 Despite the objective of providing greater theoretical specificity concerning the role of self-esteem in social identity theory, a review of more than 40 studies published one decade later led to the conclusion that "no convincing evidence is found for the self-esteem hypothesis in its full and unqualified form" (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998, p. 40) .
The uncertain standing of the self-esteem hypothesis has led researchers to posit various measurement solutions intended to further specify the hypothesis including measuring more specific types of self-esteem (e.g., specific, social, state self-esteem; Hunter et al., 2005; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998 ; see also Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Long & Spears, 1997) or measuring self-esteem more implicitly (Smurda, Wittig, & Gokalp, 2006) . In this work, however, we provide a more theoretical account of the controversial relation between discrimination and self-esteem. In keeping with Turner's (1999) recommendation that one should consider the specific norms, values, and goals that are salient in that particular social context when considering the relationship between discrimination and self-esteem, we argue that discrimination is often unrelated or even negatively related to self-esteem because it conflicts with general norms about the fair treatment of the out-group.
A BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON DISCRIMINATION AND SELF-ESTEEM
An ironic (albeit seldom discussed) aspect of the assumed relationship between discrimination and selfesteem is the assumption that people derive positive feelings about themselves (self-esteem) from what is generally regarded as negative behavior (discrimination; see also Mummendey & Otten; 1998; Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000) . Indeed, several lines of research show that the expression of discrimination can be detrimental to self-esteem. Branscombe and Wann (1994) found that although out-group derogation was positively related to self-esteem when the in-group was under threat, under no-threat conditions, out-group derogation was negatively related to self-esteem. Other work has also shown that people experience negative self-directed affect (e.g., guilt) when other in-group members discriminate against an out-group (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998) or when detecting their own racial bias during an implicit association test (Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001 ). This work thus shows that the illegitimate treatment of an out-group can lead to depressed self-esteem probably because it violates a general norm for fairness. The implication is that when such a fairness norm is salient the prior expression of fairness rather than discrimination will be positively related to self-esteem.
In this work we test these propositions by examining the influence of intergroup competition on self-esteem after one has treated the out-group in a fair or discriminatory way. We propose that fair play is the general norm when engaging in intergroup competition. This is in keeping with the notion that fair play is the predominant ideal in modern sport (Loland, 1998) . By making fairness norms salient, the introduction of an intergroup competition thus provides a frame for interpreting the past treatment of the out-group. We propose that when engaging in intergroup competition, awareness that one has previously discriminated against the out-group will lead to depressed self-esteem because this prior behavior conflicts with the general norm for fair-play that the competition prescribes. By contrast, knowing that one has previously treated the out-group in a fair manner should lead to enhanced selfesteem, as one has behaved in line with the general norm for fair play. These are the basic hypotheses that will be tested in this work.
It is important to note that the above rationale only applies to situations in which discrimination is seen as illegitimate, as is the case for instance when both groups are of equal status. When the in-group has low status or is threatened or was previously mistreated by the outgroup, discrimination may be more legitimate and is, therefore, less likely to lead to depressed self-esteem (Branscombe & Wann, 1994 ; see also Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006) . This rationale is in keeping with work that has stressed the importance of morality and justice in the context of social identity (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996) . For example, Leach and colleagues (2007) have shown that morality is a more powerful source of group virtue than are group competence or sociability. Our rationale also shares similarities with the group value model by Tyler and colleagues (Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998; Tyler et al., 1996) . The group value model states that the use of fair procedures by authorities leads to a stronger sense of positive social identity (pride, collective self-esteem). Despite this commonality, this work differs from the group value model in focusing on the treatment of out-groups as a source of (positive) social identity and esteem. That is, whereas the group value model has primarily focused on the fair treatment by authorities within a group, we examine whether the fair treatment of out-group members can also be a source of self-esteem. We think this is an important addition because high self-esteem stemming from intragroup processes can of course still lead to negative behavior toward the out-group (e.g., discrimination), whereas we aim to show that a positive social identity can even be obtained from positive behavior toward the out-group.
THIS RESEARCH
In two studies we examined the influence of a salient intergroup competition on the relationship between previous intergroup discrimination or fairness and collective self-esteem. In Study 1 we used real groups, and in Study 2 we used a (quasi-)minimal group paradigm. We either measured or manipulated prior treatment of the out-group: In Study 1 participants allocated resources between the groups, and in Study 2 we gave explicit feedback about how the participant had rated in-group and out-group products. In both studies we manipulated the presence or absence of an intergroup competition that would take place after the group ratings or allocations were made. In other words, discrimination and fairness were always measured or manipulated before the intergroup competition. Although discrimination and fairness can of course also be expressed during the competition, and we do think that the current rationale also applies to some extent to that situation, we chose to disentangle the two factors to assure orthogonal manipulations (i.e., in that the competition did not influence the expression of discrimination and vice versa). We were primarily interested in how the introduction of an intergroup competition alters the relation between previously expressed discrimination and self-esteem. In both studies we measured (resulting) collective self-esteem.
Our general hypotheses were as follows: More prior discrimination (and less prior fairness) will lead to higher collective self-esteem in the absence than in the presence of a salient intergroup competition (H1). Less prior discrimination (and more prior fairness) will lead to higher collective self-esteem in the presence than in the absence of a salient intergroup competition (H2).
STUDY 1
In this first study, the intergroup context was based on two rival universities: the University of Amsterdam and the Free University of Amsterdam. Freshmen students at the University of Amsterdam made allocations of a valued resource (scholarships to spend a period of study in the United States of America) between students of the two universities. After the resource allocations, for participants in the competition condition, we then introduced a competition with the out-group. We told participants that the two universities were in competition for funding to improve the study facilities for students. The university with the most creative ideas on how to improve these facilities would win a substantial amount of money that was made available by the government to put the ideas into practice. It was also announced that students' ideas about how to improve the student facilities would be collected later during the semester. Finally, all participants completed a collective self-esteem scale.
As we had no fairness condition in the first study and the participants divided an odd number of resources, the allocations were always biased in the direction of either the in-group (discrimination) or the out-group (out-group favoritism). Therefore, in the first study we examined Hypotheses 1 and 2 in terms of more or less discrimination and not yet in terms of fairness. We predicted that when one has previously expressed high levels of discrimination, collective self-esteem will be higher in the absence than in the presence of a salient intergroup competition because the competition makes a fair play norm salient, which is at odds with previously expressed discrimination. Furthermore, we predicted that when one has previously expressed low levels of discrimination (and more out-group favoritism) collective self-esteem will be higher in the presence than in the absence of a salient intergroup competition because the previously expressed behavior fits with the fairness norm that intergroup competition primes.
Method
Participants and design. First-year psychology students at the University of Amsterdam (N = 137) participated in this study as part of a course requirement. The design consisted of one continuous measured variable (resource allocation between in-group and out-group) and one manipulated variable (intergroup competition) with two levels (no competition vs. competition).
Procedure. The study was part of a mass testing session. The first part consisted of making a resource allocation between the in-group (University of Amsterdam) and a relevant out-group (Free University of Amsterdam). It was explained that "nowadays much of the money for student services are allocated by region, which means that universities in a specific region of the Netherlands (like the University of Amsterdam and the Free University of Amsterdam) often compete with each other for certain funding options like scholarships for students to study some time abroad." After this, participants were asked to give advice on how to divide 135 scholarships for the United States of America between students of the University of Amsterdam (the in-group) and the Free University of Amsterdam (the out-group). They reported their allocations on two dotted lines that were labeled "University of Amsterdam students" and "Free University of Amsterdam students," respectively. The participants were asked to ensure that the total added up to 135.
After this, participants in the no-competition condition proceeded directly to the collective self-esteem measure (see below). Participants in the competition condition first proceeded to a page on which they learned about a competition between the University of Amsterdam and the Free University of Amsterdam. It was explained that the Ministry of Education had made money available to improve the study facilities for the larger undergraduate programs at the Dutch universities (e.g., to provide work spaces and computers for students). Therefore, the government was holding a competition between the different universities. All students and staff at the different universities were invited to make suggestions for how to improve the study climate at their specific faculty. The university with the best ideas would have greater chances to win a €400,000 grant to improve its study facilities. It was stated that the psychology department at the University of Amsterdam and the economics department at the Free University of Amsterdam were the most likely candidates to win the grant. Participants were then asked to help generate ideas for investing the potential grant in their department. It was mentioned that they would have a week to think of possible options and that during the next testing session, 1 week later, their ideas would be collated. Then the participants in the competition condition also proceeded to the dependent measure.
Dependent measure. Collective self-esteem was measured using Luhtanen and Crocker's (1992) collective self-esteem scale, adapted to the current intergroup situation. This comprises four subscales, each of which consists of four items: membership esteem (e.g., "I'm a worthy member of the group 'University of Amsterdam psychology students'"; α = .63), private collective selfesteem (e.g., "I'm a glad to be a University of Amsterdam psychology student"; α = .74), public collective self-esteem (e.g., "Generally, University of Amsterdam psychology students are positively evaluated by others"; α = .84), and importance for identity (e.g., "The group 'University of Amsterdam Psychology students' forms an important reflection of who I am"; α = .82). For the analyses reported below, we used a composite measure of the different subscales (Luhtanen and Crocker, 1992) . Responses were given using 9-point scales with not at all and very much as endpoints.
Results
Despite our request to ensure that the total resources allocated to the in-group and the out-group added up to 135, a small minority of the participants (n = 9) failed to do this. Their data were excluded from further analysis. 2 We subtracted the resources allocated to the outgroup from resources allocated to the in-group. The resulting scale ran from -135 (out-group favoritism) to 135 (discrimination), had a mean of 8.75 (SD = 27.09), and was somewhat positively skewed (skewness = 1.16). Higher scores on this scale indicate more discrimination and less out-group favoritism.
We tested our predictions by means of multiple regression, with collective self-esteem as the dependent variable. Following Aiken and West (1991) , the predictors (the measured resource allocation scale and the manipulated intergroup competition) were centered at zero. We entered these predictors in a first step, followed by their interaction in Step 2.
The predicted interaction between resource allocations and intergroup competition was significant, B = -.76, p < .01. This interaction is displayed in Figure  1 . We selected data points for estimating regression lines at ±1 SD for predictors of the regression equation (Aiken & West, 1991) . In line with predictions, for those who had previously displayed relatively high levels of discrimination (Mean + 1 SD) collective self-esteem was higher in the no-competition condition than in the competition condition, B = -.11, p < .05, whereas for those who had previously displayed relatively high levels of out-group favoritism in a previous stage of the experiment (Mean -1 SD) collective self-esteem was higher in the competition condition than in the no-competition condition, B = .11, p < .05. In addition, in the no-competition condition prior discrimination was positively related to collective self-esteem, B = .80, p < .05, whereas in the competition condition prior discrimination was negatively related to collective self-esteem, B = -.72, p < .05.
Discussion
The results provide initial support for our hypotheses. In line with Hypotheses 1 and 2, at high levels of previously expressed discrimination, the introduction of an intergroup competition led to lower collective selfesteem, whereas at low levels of previously expressed discrimination (in fact, out-group favoritism) the introduction of a competition led to higher collective selfesteem. Put differently, in the absence of intergroup competition, prior discrimination was positively related to collective self-esteem, whereas in the presence of intergroup competition, prior discrimination was negatively related to collective self-esteem. We explain these effects by assuming that a competition primes a fairness norm, which makes people who previously have been generous toward the out-group feel good about their social identity and people who previously discriminated against the out-group feel bad about their social identity. This fits with other evidence that discrimination can undermine a positive social identity because it is negatively evaluated (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Doosje et al., 1998; Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Reynolds et al., 2000) .
Although the results were in keeping with our predictions, a shortcoming of this first study is that we measured, rather than manipulated, prior discrimination. In addition, because behavior was always biased to either the in-group or the out-group in the allocation measure used here, this first study did not allow participants to respond fairly. Strictly speaking, this is not problematic for our more general rationale as the absence of discrimination would be seen as fairer than discrimination from the perspective of the out-group. However, to test Hypothesis 2 about fairness more directly, we conducted a second study and took the opportunity to manipulate discrimination and fairness.
STUDY 2
In this study, we directly manipulated prior intergroup discrimination and fairness and the presence or absence of an intergroup competition using a modified minimal group paradigm. After categorization into minimal groups, participants rated in-group and out-group products (color pictures). They then received feedback about whether they had done this in a fair or discriminatory way. Participants were then told that in a later phase of the experiment they would be making a color picture, themselves, together with other members of their social category. For participants in the competition condition, the group task was presented as a competition against the other group; for participants in the nocompetition condition the group task was not framed in any particular way.
Participants then completed two self-esteem scales: the general collective self-esteem scale (a shortened version of the one used in Study 1) and a specific collective selfesteem scale (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2002) . This latter scale tapped collective self-esteem with regard to the specific comparison dimension in this study (creativity and good taste). Rubin and Hewstone (1998) have argued that specific collective self-esteem is the most appropriate measure when addressing the relationship between discrimination and self-esteem (see also Hunter et al., 2005) . This is in line with social identity theory, which states that people strive for positive group distinctiveness along specific dimensions that are important in a given context. In the current (minimal group) context participants have only one dimension from which they can draw group meaning and esteem (i.e., creativity and good taste), so we anticipated that the specific collective self-esteem scale would be the more sensitive measure for testing our hypotheses than the more general collective self-esteem items.
We predicted that participants who received feedback that they previously discriminated against the outgroup would have higher collective self-esteem in the absence than in the presence of an intergroup competition, as the competition is expected to make a fairness norm salient, which is in conflict with the previously expressed discrimination. By contrast, we predicted that participants who received feedback that they previously behaved fairly toward the out-group would have higher collective self-esteem in the presence than in the absence of an intergroup competition because their previous behavior was in line with a norm of fair play.
Method
Participants and design. Undergraduate students (N = 78; 28 males, 48 females; 2 missing values; mean age = 23 years) participated in return for course credit. They were randomly allocated to a 2 (out-group treatment: fairness vs. discrimination) × 2 (intergroup competition: no competition vs. competition) design.
Procedure and independent variables. The experiment was run on computers and was presented as a study of perception and creativity. On arrival, participants (7 to 10 per session) were seated in cubicles. It was explained that we were studying the relationship between creativity and different ways of perceiving. First participants were categorized into minimal groups. To this end, participants rated 10 paintings (5 by Klee, 5 by Kandinsky) for attractiveness. The painting preferences were presented as a means by which the computer could assess whether the participant was an analytical or a synthetic perceiver. All participants were categorized as synthetic perceivers. After categorization we checked that participants were aware of their category.
All participants then judged a series of 10 color pictures in terms of creativity and attractiveness. These pictures all consisted of the same abstract image (a collection of triangles, squares, and circles) in which only the color combinations were varied. Half the pictures were presented as having been made by members of the in-group and the other half as having been made by members of the out-group. We told them that the pictures were created in previous experimental sessions. With the help of a pilot study (N = 15) we created two groups of pictures that were equal in perceived creativity and attractiveness.
After participants had rated the group products, we provided them with feedback about their ratings. This provided the out-group treatment manipulation. A bar divided into three colored sections was shown on the computer screen. The left section of the bar was labeled "products by analytic perceivers judged more positively than products by synthetic perceivers" (i.e., out-group favoritism); the middle section was labeled "products by analytic perceivers judged equally positive compared to products by synthetic perceivers" (i.e., fairness); the right section of the bar was labeled "products by synthetic perceivers judged more positively than products by analytic perceivers" (i.e., discrimination). Depending on condition, the participant's name (which had been typed in earlier by the participant) appeared above one of the three sections to indicate the way in which he or she had rated the pictures. In the fairness condition the name appeared in the middle part of the bar (indicating that the participant had evaluated the pictures made by the two groups equally), whereas in the discrimination condition the name appeared on the right-hand side of the bar (indicating that the participant had favored the pictures made by the in-group over those made by the out-group).
After the feedback about picture ratings the participants engaged in a group task. The task consisted of making a color picture with three other in-group members. The basis for this picture was the same as that used in the pictures participants had rated in the earlier phase of the experiment. There was no face-to-face contact during the task; participants were told that interaction took place via the computer network. Participants sat at their computer and registered their color preferences while observing the choices made by their in-group fellows. In fact, the responses of the other members were generated by the computer and were the same for all participants. The participants and their "fellow group members" made their color selections in turn so that they sometimes had to wait on each other; they also could only finish the task as a group. This in combination contributes to the group character of the task (see also Scheepers et al., 2002 , for another illustration of this task).
The competition manipulation was implemented by framing the task in one of two ways. In the no-competition condition, participants were only given instructions about how to work on the task. For participants in the competition condition, the task was also framed in terms of an intergroup competition. We told participants that the subgroup (synthetic or analytic perceivers) creating the most attractive picture would be rewarded with gift certificates. After the competition manipulation but before the task, participants completed the general collective self-esteem scale. After the task, participants completed the specific collective self-esteem scale (see below), were debriefed, thanked, and paid for their participation.
Dependent measures. Just before judging the in-group and out-group products, we checked whether participants were aware of their category membership; participants could click on one of two buttons: one labeled "synthetic perceivers" and one labeled "analytic perceivers." After receiving feedback on how the participant had rated the in-group and out-group products, we tested the success of this manipulation using a similar procedure. This time there were three buttons, one labeled "judged the products by analytic perceivers more positively than the products of the synthetic perceivers," another labeled "judged the products by analytic perceiver's and synthetic perceivers equally positively," and a third labeled "judged the products by synthetic perceivers more positively than the products of the analytic perceivers."
Just after the competition manipulation but before the actual group task, participants completed the private (α = .61) and membership (α = .69) subscales of the collective self-esteem scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) . We used these two subscales because the other two scales (importance for identity and public collective self-esteem) are less relevant in a minimal group situation. We combined the two subscales into a single index. In addition, after the group task we measured specific collective self-esteem using four items (e.g., "I'm happy with the good taste of the group synthetic perceivers"; α = .83). Finally, we also measured the cognitive component of group identification (i.e., self-categorization) using three items (e.g., "I identify with the group synthetic perceivers"; α = .91). Because there can be large individual differences in the extent to which people are willing to categorize themselves as members of minimal groups and self-categorization is a prerequisite for drawing esteem from the group, we controlled for this in the analyses on collective self-esteem (which can be seen as the more affective component of identification) to reduce variance and increase the sensitivity to differences in self-esteem (see Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2005 , for a similar analytic strategy). Participants responded to all collective self-esteem and identification items by placing crosses-using the mouse-on 100-point scales with not at all and very much as endpoints.
Results
Checks. All participants indicated their group membership in accordance with the intended manipulation. In addition, the responses on the feedback check revealed that all participants had understood our feedback regarding how they had rated the pictures.
For all analyses reported below, 2 (out-group treatment: fairness vs. discrimination) × 2 (intergroup competition: no competition vs. competition) ANOVAs were used. For the analysis of the collective self-esteem scales we included group identification as a covariate. The identification and self-esteem items loaded on different factors in factor analyses (factor loadings > .50).
The correlation between identification and collective self-esteem was .273 (p = .016) while the correlation between identification and specific self-esteem was .655 (p < .001).
3
Collective self-esteem. With regard to general collective self-esteem, we found a main effect of competition, qualified by the predicted interaction between out-group treatment and intergroup competition, F(1, 74) = 4.24, p < .05 (see Table 1 ). Participants who had received feedback that they had previously treated the out-group fairly had higher collective self-esteem when they were involved in an intergroup competition than when they were not involved in the competition, F(1, 74) = 9.38, p < .01. Among participants who had received feedback that they had discriminated against the out-group there were no differences between those who were and those who were not involved in an inter-group competition, F(1, 74) = 0.02, ns. No other simple main effects were significant.
On the specific collective self-esteem scale there was only a significant interaction between out-group treatment and intergroup competition, F(1, 74) = 9.46, p < .01 (see Table 1 ). Participants who had received feedback that they had previously treated the out-group in a fair manner had higher specific collective self-esteem when they were involved in the intergroup competition than when they were not involved in the intergroup competition, F(1, 74) = 5.01, p < .05. Additionally, participants who had received feedback that they had previously treated the out-group in a discriminatory manner had higher specific collective self-esteem when they were not involved in the intergroup competition than when they were involved in the intergroup competition, F(1, 74) = 4.46, p < .05. Moreover, participants in the no-competition condition who had received feedback that they had previously discriminated against the out-group had higher specific collective self-esteem than did those who had received fairness feedback, F(1, 74) = 5.44, p < .05, whereas participants in the competition condition who had received feedback that they had previously treated the out-group in a fair manner had higher specific collective self-esteem than did participants who had received discrimination feedback, F(1, 74) = 4.08, p < .05.
Discussion
The results of the Study 2 replicated and extended those of Study 1. Using a fully experimental design and by directly manipulating fairness and discrimination, we showed that when given feedback that one had previously behaved fairly against the out-group, participants had higher general and specific collective self-esteem in the context of an intergroup competition than when there was no competition. In addition, when given feedback that one had previously discriminated against the out-group, participants had higher specific collective selfesteem in the absence than in the presence of intergroup competition. These results are in line with our hypothesis. We explain these effects in terms of the (non)existence of a fit between one's previous behavior with a fairness norm made salient by the intergroup competition.
In addition to the more general collective self-esteem scale, we measured collective self-esteem with respect to the central dimension in the study, namely creativity and good taste. We did so following Rubin and Hewstone's (1998; see also Hunter et al., 2005; Long & Spears, 1997) recommendation that this is the form of self-esteem best suited to assessing the self-esteem hypothesis. We also anticipated that this might be especially the case in minimal groups because under these conditions there is often just a single dimension on which groups can be meaningfully compared. In line with this analysis we found that the predicted cross-over interaction was only present on this more specific collective selfesteem scale. Although we also found a significant interaction on the more general collective self-esteem scale, the simple main effect was only significant in the fairness condition. This can be accounted for by arguing that the positive effect of prior fairness on collective selfesteem is based on very general and basic human values ("we are a fair group"), whereas the effects of prior intergroup differentiation on collective self-esteem are more dimension specific (Hunter et al., 2005; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) . Another explanation, however, is that discrimination in this study was experienced somewhat less strongly compared to the first study, where we examined the discrimination that was actually displayed by the participants themselves rather than giving them feedback.
The inclusion of collective self-esteem measures both before and after the group task also helps to reduce the plausibility of an alternative explanation of our results in the discrimination condition in terms of defensive pessimism. It could be argued that those who have initially shown discrimination and then hear that they will compete on an equal playing field with the out-group may temper their expressions of collective self-esteem to hedge against a potential loss. We would argue, however, that the effects of defensive pessimism should be especially prevalent just after the introduction of the task but before performing the task because then uncertainty about group performance should be highest. However, we did not find differences on the collective self-esteem scale before the task between the participants who got prior discrimination feedback and then were told that they would compete with the out-group and those who were not told they would compete with the out-group. This makes an explanation in terms of defensive pessimism arguably less likely.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In each of two studies we demonstrated that previously expressed discrimination predicted stronger increases in collective self-esteem in the absence than in the presence of an competition with the out-group. By contrast, the prior expression of fairness led to higher collective self-esteem in the presence of an inter-group competition then in the absence of an intergroup competition. These results are in line with our hypotheses and are explained by the proposition that intergroup competition primes a fairness norm. As a result, knowing that one has previously mistreated the out-group made people feel bad about themselves, whereas knowing that one has treated the out-group well made people feel good about themselves.
Implications for the Role of Self-esteem in Discrimination and Social Identity A critic might regard these results as further evidence for the controversial standing of the self-esteem hypothesis, demonstrating as they do that discrimination is not always positively related to self-esteem. However, our findings arguably contribute to the explanation of why the relationship is sometimes present and sometimes absent. In this respect, we argue that the relationship between discrimination and self-esteem is complex rather than controversial. By considering the influence of intergroup competition and the norms that this makes salient, and by considering alternative intergroup behaviors (fairness), it becomes possible to predict when discrimination should enhance self-esteem, when it should not enhance self-esteem, and indeed when fairness should serve to enhance self-esteem. As a result, it can be concluded that the self-esteem hypothesis seems to apply in particular to circumstances where there is no impending intergroup competition and no norm for fairness salient. The finding that competition can actually inhibit the relationship between prior discrimination and self-esteem is salutary given the assumption in much research and theorizing that conflict and discrimination between groups is likely to emerge precisely during (or as a product of) direct competition between them. Whereas intergroup competition is often seen as closely bound up with discrimination-as is the case in realistic group conflict theory and social identity theory, for example-this finding presents perhaps a rare and refreshing reminder that competition is not always associated with discrimination. More specifically, this finding is also in line with Turner's (1999) proposal that when addressing the relationship between discrimination and self-esteem one needs to take into account the social context in which discrimination takes place together with the specific norms, values, and goals of the group. Beyond that, it also is consistent with the view that justice and morality are central dimensions of social identity (Leach et al., 2007; Tyler et al., 1996) .
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
Although our experiments consistently show the collective self-esteem enhancing function of previously expressed fairness when an intergroup competition is introduced, we do not think that fairness will always have this effect (even in the face of competition between groups). For instance, in extremely competitive or threatening circumstances, it seems likely that discrimination rather than fairness would result in a stronger or more positive social identity (Branscombe & Wann, 1994) .
Another issue for future research concerns the influence of different types of in-group bias on self-esteem. In this work, we focused on behavioral manifestations of ingroup bias (i.e., discrimination). It is possible, however, that other types of bias (more cognitive or evaluative types) are less likely to lead to drops in self-esteem in the context of intergroup competition because they are less inherently related to justice concerns than reward allocations. On a related note, we did not make the distinction between in-group favoring and out-group derogatory forms of bias in this research. Following the current rationale, it can be expected that in-group favoritism is more functional than out-group derogation in increasing selfesteem (especially in the presence of impending competition) not only because it focuses more directly on distinctive aspects of the in-group identity but because it fosters positive group distinctiveness without engaging in socially disapproved behavior (see also Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Reynolds et al., 2000) .
Finally, future work might address how specific emotions such as guilt and regret relate to the effects that we found here on collective self-esteem. As our starting point was the relationship between discrimination and social identity and our aim was to address how discrimination can both positively and negatively reflect on collective self-esteem, we did not measure the specific emotions that were experienced as the result of discrimination feedback in Study 2, for example. It is possible that feelings of guilt and/or regret might drive the drops in collective selfesteem after hearing about the upcoming intergroup competition. Although we consider this more a further refinement of, rather than alternative to, our general argument, this issue deserves further attention in future work.
We began this article by noting the controversial standing of the relationship between discrimination and self-esteem. We hope to have reduced some of the controversy, albeit at the expense of increased theoretical complexity, by focusing on fairness as a source of positive social identity and discrimination as a source of negative social identity when it is in conflict with norms for fair play. In doing so, we think we have done justice to the complex nature of intergroup relationships. Although social identity theory has sometimes been reduced to the prediction that there will be a correlation between group identification and discrimination or between discrimination and self-esteem, the original aim of the theory was to provide greater insight into the dynamic interplay of constructs such as identification, discrimination, and self-esteem in relation to the social context. We believe that this analysis fits well with a more complex and contextualist, and in our view more complete, account of intergroup relations.
NOTES

